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Abstract 
For some individuals, daily decisions are a struggle because they worry about the regret they will 
feel if they make a poor choice. This regret-based decision style is associated with lower decision 
confidence, lower general self-efficacy and lower optimism, and greater decisional self-doubt. 
This study sought to improve these individuals’ decision confidence by selecting those with a 
slight tendency toward either an analytical or an intuitive decision-style and reinforcing this 
existing tendency. This intervention was predicted to increase their confidence because 
endorsing either style correlates positively with self-efficacy and optimism, and negatively with 
decisional self-doubt. Fifty-eight regret-based individuals with slight analytical or intuitive 
tendencies, or both (“flexible” decision-makers) were selected using The Decision-Making 
Styles Inventory. Individuals from each of the 3 decision-style groups were randomly assigned to 
manipulation or control conditions. Subjects completed General Self-Efficacy and Optimism 
measures. Then the 3 manipulation groups were informed of their decision-making tendencies, 
and the benefits of their particular styles, while control groups were simply told that people use 
various decision styles. Next subjects responded to decision scenarios, rating decision confidence 
and difficulty for each, and then completed the self-efficacy and optimism measures again. The 
only statistically significant result was that the manipulation group had lower decision 
confidence.  Overall, the manipulation did not produce the predicted results.  If the results had 
been as predicted, this intervention would have provided support for a relatively simple way to 
increase decision confidence in those who worry about experiencing decisional regret. 
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Improving Decision Confidence in Regret-Based Decision-Makers 
 
Each day, people make many different decisions using a variety of approaches which 
could be termed “decision-making styles.” Research has shown that individuals have a consistent 
tendency to rely on particular decision approaches (Beach & Mitchell, 1978; Einhorn, 1970; 
Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). A self-report instrument, the Decision Making Styles 
Inventory (DMI) was created by Nygren (2000) to assess the degree to which people rely on 
these individual styles. It allows researchers to determine if individuals are more prone to report 
an “analytical” decision making style, an “intuitive” decision making style, or a “regret-based 
emotional” decision making style.  
Individuals who show a greater propensity toward an analytical style are more likely to 
thoroughly analyze their choice options, typically comparing choice alternatives and their 
attributes using a structured decision rule to derive what they perceive to be an optimal decision. 
Individuals with propensity toward an intuitive decision style tend to go with their instincts 
instead of systematically analyzing their decision options and come up with their decisions by 
relying on their “gut-feeling” or satisficing. They are less likely to use a specific decision rule.  
The concept of these two decision types can be seen as an outgrowth of dual process 
theory, which argues that people use two different modes of thinking—analytical-rational and 
intuitive-experiential (Epstein, 1994, 1998; Sloman, 1996).  The Rational Experiential Inventory 
(REI), developed by Epstein and colleagues (1996) to measure these two modes, has been 
compared to the DMI. The intuitive scale of the DMI correlates highly with the intuitive-
experiential scale (r=.633) of the REI. This suggests they are measuring much the same 
construct. The analytical scale of the DMI correlates only modestly with Epstein’s REI Rational 
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scale (r=.384), which is a modified Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Need for 
cognition refers to the tendency for people to vary in the extent to which they engage in and 
enjoy effortful cognitive activities, and though an analytical decision style is related to need for 
cognition, it is conceptually different (Nygren & White, 2002). 
The third decision style measured by the DMI is a Regret-based emotional style. These 
decision makers typically wish to avoid making decisions due to fear of regret. They would not 
endorse statements such as “I think that I could keep myself from worrying later if I had made a 
bad decision,” but would endorse items such as “I often procrastinate when it comes to making 
important decisions” (Nygren, 2000; Nygren & White, 2002). This decision style can be related 
to the self-protective role of negative emotions, such as regret, which has been actively 
investigated in pursuit of understanding decision making behaviors (Josephs, Larrick, Steele & 
Nisbett, 1992).    
The three decision making styles measured by the DMI are conceptualized as 
independent constructs, allowing for individuals to employ different styles to varying degrees. 
Thus, an individual’s propensity toward one style does not preclude use of the other two styles 
(Nygren & White, 2002).   
The emotional regret-based decision style correlates with a number of potentially 
negative characteristics (Nygren & White, 2002). In one recent study, there was a positive 
correlation between regret-based decision-making and the decision difficulty subscale of the 
Maximization Inventory (Tuner, Rim, Betz, & Nygren, 2012; Rim, 2012). Decision difficulty 
represents the degree of difficulty experienced when choosing among abundant options. 
Although having some mild decision difficulty is not necessarily a negative thing, having too 
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much can be quite detrimental, especially if someone has a tendency to wish to avoid or 
procrastinate on decisions, as regret-based individuals do 
In another study by Nygren and White (2005), it was found that a regret-based decision 
making style was associated with greater generalized self-efficacy, generalized self-regard, 
instrumentality, optimism, emotional stability and decisional-self-doubt.  This makes sense 
because the anticipated negative emotions associated with this style are related to negative self-
concepts, such as low self-efficacy and low self-regard (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 
1992). Additionally, pessimists (i.e., individuals with low optimism) tend to focus on anticipated 
stresses, such as regret, rather than desired goals, when they have decisional tasks to accomplish 
(Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). 
Endorsement of either an analytical or intuitive decision-making style was associated 
with lower decision-difficulty and greater generalized self-efficacy, generalized self-regard, 
instrumentality, optimism and emotional stability. Endorsement of both decision styles showed 
an even greater positive correlation with self-efficacy, self-regard, instrumentality, optimism and 
emotional stability. This makes sense because positive self-concepts have been identified as 
major sources of cognitive motivation (Bandura & Schunk, 1981) and analytical decision making 
demands the use of cognitive resources.  Therefore, it follows that individuals with high 
analytical style would tend to have positive self-concepts such as high self-efficacy.  People with 
positive self-concepts also have a tendency to overestimate their decision making competencies 
(Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993).  Accordingly, individuals with high intuitive style 
would likely have positive self-concepts, based on their willingness to follow “gut” feelings in 
order to maximize decision making outcomes. Additionally, dispositional optimism has also 
been associated with coping strategies used to overcome challenges in various domains (Carver, 
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Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989).  More specifically, people with positive expectations for their 
future tend to use problem-focused coping strategies to achieve their goals.  Therefore, it makes 
sense that optimism positively correlated with analytical and intuitive decision making styles, 
which both use problem-focused strategies to maximize decision making outcomes 
 Clearly there are a number of negative traits tied to being a regret-based decision-maker, 
and a variety of positive traits related to endorsing either an analytical or intuitive style.  The 
previous study also showed that in those individuals who endorsed both an analytical and regret-
based or intuitive and regret-based style, the negative correlation with the previously mentioned 
traits actually was smaller than in those who were simply regret-based (Nygren & White, 2005). 
This brings up the question of whether encouraging someone who is regret-based, but who also 
shows some degree of analytical or intuitive propensity, to focus on these more efficacious 
decision-making styles, rather than on their fear of regret or decision avoidance, would lead to 
more positive outcomes and self-confidence for this individual. Previously, little research has 
examined the possibility of attempting to increase the decision confidence, and decrease the 
decision avoidance of regret-based decision makers. If it were possible to make individuals less 
decision avoidant and create a lasting change in these individuals decision-making confidence it 
could have positive implications in their everyday decision-making and possibly result in a 
lasting reduction some of the negative traits associated with avoidance such as low self-efficacy 
and low optimism.  
Based on past research, we hypothesized that regret-based decision-making individuals 
who are also analytical or intuitive or both (flexible decision-makers) and are told that they have 
been found to be analytical, intuitive or flexible decision-makers, respectively, and the benefits 
of their decision-making style, would have higher decision confidence and less decision 
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difficulty than individuals who are not informed of their decision-making style. They would also 
see an increase in generalized self-efficacy and optimism after being reinforced in their decision 
style, while those not reinforced would see no change. 
Methods 
Participants 
One-hundred-twenty-one Psychology 1100 students from the Ohio State University were 
recruited via the REP for class credit over the course of the 2013-2014 school-year.  
Materials 
 Decision Style Measure DMI (Nygren, 2000),  a 45-item self-report measure using a 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree rating scale, was used to assess individual decision making 
styles (i.e., analytical, intuitive, and regret-based).  Participants rated how strongly they agreed 
with statements like “I feel that if I plan my decisions carefully I will make good decisions” 
(analytical statement), “I can get a good ‘feeling’ for most decision situations very quickly” 
(intuitive statement) and “I tend to be someone who worries a lot over decision I’ve made” 
(regret-based statement). This scale has been shown to be internally reliable with coefficient 
alphas of .88, .86 and .86 and test-retest reliabilities of .81 .81, and .87, for the analytical, 
intuitive, and regret-based scales, respectively (Nygren, 2000). The validity of the analytical 
decision making style scale is supported because those who endorse an intuitive style are high in 
impulsivity (r = .320) and belief in luck (r = .274), while those who endorse an analytical style 
are less likely to be risk seeking (r = -.214) or impulsive (r = -.394), and are more likely to be 
rational thinkers (r = .333 with Epstein’s REI Experiential Scale (S. Epstein et. Al, 1996)). Those 
who endorse an avoidant regret-based decision style are also less likely to be risk-takers  
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(r= - .303) and, unlike analytical decision-makers, are also high in self-doubt (r = .463), which is 
as expected  (Nygren, T. & White, R.J., 2005). See the complete DMI in Appendix A.  
 Other Measures. The Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) 
was used to measure a generalized expectation of success rather than failure in new situations. It 
consists of a ten-item scale in which subjects rank how strongly they agree with statements like 
“if I am in trouble I can usually think of a solution” (1=not at all true, 4=exactly true). Reliability 
is supported because in samples from 23 nations, Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .76 to .90, with 
the majority in the high .80s. Criterion-related validity is documented in numerous correlation 
studies where positive correlations were found with favorable emotions, dispositional optimism, 
and work satisfaction. Negative correlations were found with depression, anxiety, stress, burnout, 
and health complaints (Leganger, Kraft & Røysamb, 2000;  Schwarzer, Mueller & Greenglass, 
1999; Luszczynska, Scholz & Schwarzer, 2005). See the Generalized Self-Efficacy scale in 
Appendix B. 
The Optimism Scale-Revised (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). A 10-item scale (4 filler items) 
in which subjects rank how strongly they agree with statements like “in uncertain times, I usually 
expect the best” (1=I DISagree a lot, 5=I agree a lot). Item scale correlations ranged from .43 to 
.63, showing that each item to some extent measures the same underlying construct but is not 
redundant with other items. Test-retest correlations were .68 for 4 months, .60 for 12, .56 for 24, 
and .79 for 28, which shows relative stability over time. The scale also correlates positively with 
self-esteem and self-mastery, and negatively with neuroticism and trait anxiety, which is as 
expected (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). See the Revised Optimism Scale in Appendix C. 
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Procedure 
The DMI was administered electronically to each participant. Individuals who scored 
relatively high in regret (top 50%) and relatively high (top 50%) in one of the other two decision 
styles under consideration (either analytical or intuitive decision-making style) or in both 
(considered a “flexible” decision style) were selected, resulting in a sample size of 58. The 
regret-based individuals in these analytical, intuitive, and “flexible” groups were then divided 
into a control group and an experimental group, producing a 2x3 between-subjects design. See 
Figure 1 for a detailed diagram of participant group assignment. After completing the DMI, 
subjects also completed The Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale and The Optimism Scale-Revised. 
Participants in each experimental group then read a statement explaining that the 
individual scored highly in terms of propensity towards using an analytical or intuitive decision-
making style or both, respectively, and the benefits of using their particular styles. For example, 
analytical decision-makers were told that analytical decision-makers “tend to analyze the choice 
alternatives and use critical thinking to make their choices. This yields well thought-out 
decisions.” Subjects were also given several examples of when their decision style would be 
effective in the real world. For example, analytical individuals were told that “doctors need to 
thoroughly examine patient symptoms, and systematically determine a diagnosis”. The control 
groups were simply told that people use a variety of different decision-making styles in their 
daily lives and that these have both benefits and drawbacks based on a given situation. See 
Appendix D for a full description of the instructions received by each manipulation group and 
the control group.  
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Each group then completed a series of thirteen decision-making tasks, which consisted of 
open-ended questions in which subjects chose between options in realistic and semi-realistic 
scenarios. For example, they were asked to select an apartment to rent from a list of potential 
apartments (including information like rent, space, parking availability, etc.). See Appendix E for 
a complete list of decision scenarios. 
After each decision, participants reported their decision confidence and rated the 
difficulty of making the decision, via Likert-type scales, as well as completing a manipulation 
check. The check asked them to rate the extent to which they assessed their choice options, 
which was meant to quantify to what extent they approached the decision analytically.  It also 
asked them to rate and the extent to which they made an instinctive decision, which was meant to 
assess the extent to which they approached the decision intuitively. See Appendix F for the 
decision confidence and difficulty scales, as well as the manipulation check questions. At the end 
of the experiment, they again rated their self-efficacy and optimism.  
Results 
 We hypothesized that regret-based decision-makers who also had a tendency to be either 
somewhat analytical or intuitive or both (flexible) and correspondingly were informed of this 
tendency, and the benefits of their respective analytical, intuitive or flexible style, would exhibit 
an increase in generalized self-efficacy and optimism post intervention. A control group of 
individuals who were not informed of their decision-making style would see no change. Further, 
the manipulation group was predicted to show higher decision confidence and less decision 
difficulty post intervention than the control group. 
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A t-test was used to compare the control (n=31) and manipulation (n=27) groups. 
Decision confidence was significantly greater in the control group (M=3.50, SD=.508) than the 
manipulation group (M=3.23, SD=.451), [t(56) = -2.16, p=.036]. Decision difficulty was non-
significantly lower in the control group (M=2.44, SD=.550) than in the manipulation group (M= 
2.55, SD=.550) [t(56)=.726, p=.471]. These results are represented in Figure 2. Neither of these 
outcomes supports the hypothesis.  
Paired-samples t-tests were conducted to compare subject pre and post-intervention self-
efficacy and optimism. In the control group there was no significant change in efficacy from pre-
intervention (M=3.16, SD=.414) to post-intervention (M=3.17, SD=.472) [t(30)=-.129, 
p=.898].Nor was there a significant change in optimism pre (M=3.60, SD=.859) to post 
(M=3.53, SD=.802) intervention [t(30)=1.25, p=.223]. This fits the hypothesis—no change was  
expected on either measure in the control group  
In the manipulation group there was no significant change in self-efficacy from pre 
(M=3.12, SD=.434) to post (M=3.05, SD=.489) intervention [t(26)=1.78, p=.087]. There was no 
significant change in optimism from pre (M=3.32, SD=1.10) to post (M=3.24, SD=1.01) 
intervention [t(26)=1.12, p=.275]. This does not support the hypothesis that the manipulation 
group would see an increase in self-efficacy and optimism. 
As a check of the effectiveness of the decision style reinforcement, individuals were 
asked to rate the extent to which they analyzed their choice options and the extent to which they 
made an instinctive decision for each of the decision scenarios. An average was then computed 
across all the scenarios.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the 
effect of a combination of initial decision-making propensity and experimental group on 
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tendency to approach decision scenarios in an intuitive or an analytical manner. The six groups 
examined were those with an initial analytical tendency who were reinforced as analytical 
(n=15), those with an initial intuitive tendency who were reinforced as intuitive (n=5), those with 
initial intuitive and analytical tendencies who were reinforced as flexible (n=7), those with 
intuitive tendencies in the control group (n=5), those with analytical tendencies in the control 
group(n=16), and those with both analytical and intuitive tendencies (n=10) in the control group. 
A one-way ANOVA was selected rather than factorial ANOVA because the independent 
variables of interest--initial decision-making tendency and experimental group, were not 
independent of each other; for those assigned to the manipulation condition, initial tendency was 
used to determine the manipulation condition into which they were placed. 
Results of the one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a significant effect of initial 
decision-making tendency/experimental group on likelihood of approaching decision scenarios 
in an intuitive manner for the six conditions [F(5, 52)=5.04, p<.01]. Post hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the analytical manipulation group (M=2.63, 
SD=.781) was significantly lower than for the flexible manipulation (M=3.45, SD=.545), flexible 
control (M=3.62, SD=.534), and intuitive control (M=3.78, SD=.378) groups. This makes sense 
because analytical decision makers might be expected to be less likely make their decision based 
on “instinct”, which is what the manipulation check asked them to rate for each decision. 
However, the finding that the intuitive manipulation group did not differ significantly from any 
of the groups in terms of tendency to approach the scenarios in an intuitive manner brings the 
effectiveness of the manipulation into question. If the manipulation had been strongly effective 
then one would have expected the intuitive manipulation group to have the strongest tendency to 
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approach scenarios intuitively, and to exhibit this tendency statistically significantly more so 
than the intuitive control group. 
 However, one must note that the flexible manipulation and control groups, as well as the 
intuitive control groups, all had greater scores on the DMI intuitive scale than the intuitive 
manipulation group did. Although not greater to the point of being significant, this does indicate 
that they may have been somewhat more intuitive to begin with, before any manipulation was 
performed--a possible confounding factor which might have negated the effected of reinforcing 
intuitive style in the intuitive manipulation group. 
There was no significant effect of initial tendency/experimental group on tendency to 
approach decision scenarios in an analytical manner for the six conditions [F(5, 52)=1.11, 
p=.368]. However, the analytical manipulation group did have the greatest tendency to approach 
scenarios in an analytical manner, followed by the flexible control group and then the analytical 
control group. Though non-significant, this trend is approximately what might have been 
predicted, aside from the highly analytic tendency of the flexible control group. Looking at the 
initial DMI scores, the flexible manipulation group had the greatest initial analytical tendency, 
followed by the analytical manipulation group, and the analytical control group (non-significant). 
This indicates that initial decision-making tendency played a role in determining how individuals 
approached the scenarios, and might have interfered with manipulation effect.  
Finally, the three experimental groups (reinforced as intuitive (n=10), analytical (15), 
flexible (n=7)) and the combined control group were also compared individually using a 1-way 
ANOVA in order to see if a perhaps reinforcing a particular decision style was more effective. 
There were no significant results.  
14 
 
Discussion 
We had hypothesized that regret-based decision-makers who were also analytical or 
intuitive or both (flexible), and were told that they had been found to be analytical, intuitive, or 
flexible respectively, and were explained the benefits of their respective decision-making styles 
would have greater decision confidence and lower decision difficulty than those who were not 
informed of and reinforced in their positive decision tendency. This hypothesis was not 
supported, as decision confidence was significantly higher in the control group and decision 
difficulty was non-significantly lower. We had further hypothesized that those affirmed in their 
decision styles would see an increase in generalized self-efficacy and optimism, while 
individuals not informed of their decision style would see no change. This hypothesis was not 
supported, as there was no significant change in optimism or self-efficacy in either group. 
Taken together, these results suggest that the manipulation may have been ineffective. A 
possible explanation might be that reinforcing an analytical style could have been ineffective in 
increasing decision confidence. Though the tendency to exhibit this decision style had been 
shown to have a positive correlation with generalized-self efficacy and optimism, which was part 
of the foundation for our initial hypothesis, this decision style only has a very small negative 
correlation with decisional self-doubt (r=-.001). The intuitive style, on the other hand, has a 
larger correlation (r=-.197) (Nygren & White, 2005).  One must note that the results of the 1-way 
ANOVA indicate that even directly comparing each manipulation group (reinforced as intuitive, 
analytical, flexible) with the control group did not yield significant results for any of the three 
manipulation groups. This indicates that the type of decision style reinforced did not affect the 
subject outcome. However, this analysis may have been lacking in power due to small sample 
size. 
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The lack of significant results may have been, in part, due to the small sample size. This 
necessitated the use of median splits, rather than a more specific, limited range to select subjects 
who endorsed a regret-based decision style. This meant that some of the individuals included 
may not have strongly endorsed a regret-based style, falling close to the median. So they may 
already have been fairly confident decision-makers, and the manipulation may have had less 
effect. Median-splits were also used to select individuals who exhibited analytical, intuitive or 
flexible tendencies. This might have resulted in the inclusion of individuals who already highly 
endorsed a particular decision style. Thus reinforcing this trait in them would not be as effective, 
because there would be little room for manipulation. On the other hand some individuals may 
have scores so close to the median that their tendency was too weak to easily reinforce. 
Finally, the small sample size resulted in fairly small group sizes when the six 
manipulation groups were compared separately (with the smallest, the intuitive control and 
manipulation groups, having only 5 subjects in each). This would have resulted in decreased 
power, and made it difficult to determine whether perhaps reinforcing one type of decision-style 
was more effective. Power would also have been an issue for the manipulation check, where the 
six groups were also compared separately. This might have made it more difficult to accurately 
assess the manipulation’s effect.  
If the study had a larger sample size (or pre-screening) it might have been more effective 
to select individuals who scored in the 55
th
 to 85
th
 percentiles in terms of analytical or intuitive 
tendency (or both), and in the top 33% in terms of regret-based tendency. This would have 
resulted in a sample of highly-regret-based decision-makers with moderate analytical or intuitive 
tendencies. The manipulation might have been most effective on such a group of individuals. 
The only drawback being that this might limit generalizability. 
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Another issue that may help to explain the lack of significant results, and that may have 
affected the internal validity of the study, was that some individuals had to restart the survey or 
redo parts of the survey due to internet connection issues. This may have impacted the internal 
validity, particularly as it is impossible to track who exactly had this happen to them and of 
which experimental group they were a part. Frustration from this issue might have impacted 
individual’s decision confidence, self-efficacy ratings, etc.  Additionally, some individuals may 
have been randomly assigned to, and received the manipulation, and then had to start the survey 
again and been randomly assigned to control group the second time through, or vice versa. This 
might have weakened the observed manipulation effect. 
Finally, self-efficacy and optimism are trait, rather than state, measures. This makes them 
more difficulty to change, particularly within the limited time frame of the study (measured 
before and after the manipulation, with likely as little as twenty minutes between measurements). 
Perhaps if the manipulation had been very strong one might have seen a difference, but even then 
it is possible that subjects completing the self-efficacy and optimism measures after the 
manipulation would have recalled, and been influence by, their previous responses to the 
questionnaires earlier in the study. It might have benefitted the study to simply focus on decision 
confidence and decision difficulty.  It might also have been interesting to have some measure of 
decision avoidance, although this would be difficult to measure with open-ended questions that 
the subjects would have had no incentive to avoid. However, perhaps the study could have used 
decision scenarios that did result in some kind of outcome, possibly with a monetary incentive 
for subjects. Then subjects could have been given the opportunity to skip questions and come 
back to them later as a measure of avoidance. Having the subjects receive feedback on their 
decisions (possibly after they had completed all the decision scenarios ) with an incentive for 
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making decisions that resulted in positive outcomes, might have also made the effects of a regret 
based style more apparent—if the subjects had more at stake in making the decisions. This idea 
is supported by the findings of a previous study which found that regret-minimizing choices 
occurred when feedback about the decisional outcome was expected, but not otherwise (Josephs, 
Larrick, Steele & Nisbett, 1992). 
Future research still needs to be conducted to determine an effective means of improving 
the decision confidence of regret-based decision makers. As people are faced with a multitude of 
decisions every day, improving the decisional confidence or those who struggle because they 
worry about the regret they will feel if they make a poor decision could help reduce daily stress 
and improve these individuals’ lives. Perhaps, if the strategy was particularly effective, it could 
be used to help almost anyone make decisions in a more self-assured way. 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 1. Flow of subjects from their initial selection to their division into control and 
manipulation groups. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Figure 2. Difference in average decision difficulty and average decision confidence across all 
decision scenarios. Comparison between the combined manipulation group (those reinforced as 
analytical, intuitive and flexible) and combined control group.  
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